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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Do you expect your government to treat you equally?  More importantly, 
do you expect your government to treat your children equally in the context 
of education?  If your child has an emotional or behavioral disability, does 
this entitle the state to segregate your child away from other students, 
providing him or her with an education that is unequal in comparison to 
general education?  Children and young adults with behavioral and 
emotional disabilities are entitled to education that is equivalent to the 
education other students receive.  It is important to examine local systems of 
education to ensure that students with disabilities are being treated equally.  
On August 23, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against the 
State of Georgia, a constituent state of the United States.  The complaint in 
the suit, captioned United States v. Georgia, targeted the Georgia Network 
for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS), a state funded program 
that provides education to students with emotional and behavioral 
disabilities.  It alleged GNETS impermissibly segregates and discriminates 
against students with behavioral and emotional disabilities.1  
The case stems from an incident in 2004, when a thirteen-year-old boy, 
Jonathan King, hanged himself in an isolation room in a GNETS facility.  An 
investigation was launched.2  The Department of Justice decided to file a 
civil action after federal-state negotiations failed. In the complaint, the 
United States alleged that the manner in which GNETS is currently being 
administered is a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
because it unnecessarily segregates students with disabilities from their 
peers.3  
What does the United Nations Human Rights Committee think about 
segregating schoolchildren with disabilities in a manner that makes their 
education unequal to the education of other students?  The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 is considered by many to be the 
leading authority on human rights standards in the international sphere.5  
What does this mean for the problem at hand?  The Covenant sets forth 
obligations that must be followed by the party states.  The United States 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Complaint, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:16-CV-03088 (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_complaint.html.    
 2 King v. Pioneer Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency, 688 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 3 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).  
 5 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR COMMENTARY, 
at XVII (1993). 
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ratified the Covenant in 1992, which means that U.S. practices and 
procedures must meet the Covenant’s human rights standards, including its 
standards in the education of children with disabilities.  
This Note aims to provide a deeper understanding of the current lawsuit 
between the United States and the State of Georgia and the applicability of 
international law to the problem.  By analyzing the applicable provisions of 
the Covenant and its jurisprudence, this Note explores whether GNETS 
practices are discriminatory under international law standards.  Part II of this 
Note will discuss the recent complaint that has been filed and the factual 
findings that were made by the DOJ in its 2015 investigation report.  Part III 
will provide an overview of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the specific provisions that are applicable to the problem, and the 
status of the Covenant in the United States.  Part IV provides an analysis of 
the manner in which the practices of GNETS violates international law 
standards and a discussion of the scope and limits of the Covenant in the 
United States.  
II.  SEGREGATIONIST PRACTICES AS A CASE STUDY IN U.S. LAW ON 
SCHOOLCHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
The United States filed a civil action against the State of Georgia.  The 
United States alleged that Georgia’s GNETS Program is a violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act because it unnecessarily segregates students 
with disabilities from their peers and provides them with unequal 
opportunities compared to those provided to students who are not in the 
program.6  
A.  State Practices Followed in GNETS, the Georgia Network for 
Educational and Therapeutic Support 
The Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS) 
consists of twenty-four state-funded programs throughout the State of 
Georgia that provide comprehensive and therapeutic support to students with 
disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one.7  In the United States’ 
Complaint, GNETS is described as a program that the State, through the 
                                                                                                                   
 6 GNETS Letter of Findings from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to 
Nathan Deal, Governor of Ga., and Sam Olens, Attorney Gen. of Ga., at 1 (July 15, 2015), 
https:// www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets_lof.pdf.   
 7 Georgia Network for Educational and Therapeutic Support (GNETS), GA. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (2015), https://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Special-Educa 
tion-Services/Pages/Georgia-Network-for-Special-Education-and-Supports.aspx.  
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Georgia Department of Education, “plans, funds, administers, licenses, 
manages, and oversees,” and it determines which mental health and 
therapeutic services will be provided, who will provide them, what settings 
they will be provided in, and how to allocate state and federal funds.8  
Students in the program have one or more of the severe characteristics within 
the disability category of emotional and behavioral disorders.9  Local schools 
throughout the state refer students to receive services from GNETS through 
the Individual Education Program, a process that evaluates students’ 
emotional and behavioral disorders based on the severity, frequency, and 
duration of the disorder.10  The State sets not only the criteria for students’ 
eligibility but also the entry and exit standards.11  Even though many of these 
students could be educated in an environment that is more integrated with 
other students, the State has chosen to provide services for students with 
behavioral-related disabilities almost exclusively in a segregated GNETS 
center or classroom.12 
The U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation into Georgia 
after Jonathan King hanged himself at the Alpine center located in 
Gainesville, Georgia in 2004.13  The media attention that surrounded the 
incident, coupled with a lawsuit that the child’s parents filed against the 
Georgia Department of Education (DOE), prompted the federal 
investigation.14  Following a Georgia trial court’s grant of the DOE’s motion 
for summary judgment, the parents appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals 
on grounds that “questions of material fact remain as to whether the Pioneer 
RESA [local school system managing Alpine] violated Jonathan’s 
substantive due process rights and further arguing that their claims against 
DOE were not barred by sovereign immunity.”15  In a unanimous decision 
issued in 2009, a three-member panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals held 
that there was not a substantive due process violation because there was no 
evidence that the two school employees who placed Jonathan in the seclusion 
room had acted with deliberate indifference; in particular, the court 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
 9 Id.   
 10 Id. ¶¶ 5–6.   
 11 Id. ¶ 5. 
 12 Id.   
 13 See Alan Judd, Georgia ‘Psychoeducation’ Case Gets Outside Lawyer, ATL.- J. CONST. 
NEWS (May 4, 2014), http://investigations.blog.ajc.com/2015/12/18/state-hires-lawyer-to-han 
dle-psychoeducation-case/; see also Alan Judd, Death Highlights Lack of Regulation at 
Georgia’s ‘Psychoeducational’ Schools, ATL.-J. CONST. NEWS (July 27, 2009), http://www.ajc. 
com/news/news/local/death-highlights-lack-of-regulation-at-psychoeduca/nQJKQ/.  
 14 King v. Pioneer Reg’l Educ. Serv. Agency, 688 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 15 Id. at 10. 
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concluded that these employees were not aware that Jonathan had threatened 
suicide weeks prior.16 
In July 2015, the United States Department of Justice issued a “letter of 
findings” addressed to Georgia’s governor and attorney general, outlining the 
results of their investigation into GNETS.17  The letter also laid out the legal 
conclusions and minimum steps that it said Georgia was required to take in 
order to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA).18  The 
U.S. Department of Justice letter concluded that the manner in which 
GNETS is administered has resulted and continues to result in segregation 
and discriminatory practices because students with disabilities are 
unnecessarily segregated from their peers and are not given opportunities 
equal to those available to other students.19  
The Department of Justice based its conclusion on a number of factors 
outlined in the letter.  First, the letter concluded that the State of Georgia 
failed to provide services to students that have been placed in GNETS in the 
most integrated setting possible to meet each student’s needs.20  Two-
thirds—3,100—of GNETS students attend school in a completely segregated 
and isolated setting that has provided students with little to no interaction 
with other students who are in general education school buildings.21  
Generally, the GNETS buildings are separate, run-down buildings located at 
a distance away from general education buildings.22  The GNETS centers 
that are situated in general education schools are either in separate wings of 
the school with separate entrances or in the school’s basement.23  The State 
incentivized general education schools to rely on GNETS to provide 
education for students with behavioral-related disabilities so local schools 
did not have to provide and fund the services that these students required in 
an integrated setting.24  This resulted in many students receiving poorer 
quality services than those received by students in general education 
schools.25  It is the State’s responsibility to ensure that these students receive 
the behavioral and therapeutic services that they require in the most 
integrated setting possible, but the structure and manner in which the State 
has operated GNETS base decisions on factors, such as geography and the 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Id. at 15. 
 17 GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 1.  
 18 Id. at 1.    
 19 Id. at 3.  
 20 Id. at 8. 
 21 Id.   
 22 Id. at 9.  
 23 Id.   
 24 Id. at 8, 10.  
 25 Id. at 10.  
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availability of services, instead of on the individualized needs of each 
student.26  
Second, the letter concluded that GNETS provides unequal educational 
opportunities to students in comparison to those provided to the general 
education student population.27  Many GNETS students only have the 
opportunity to learn core subjects (i.e., math, science, reading, writing) and 
are provided no opportunity to learn extra-curricular subjects (i.e., “art, 
music, foreign language, vocational courses . . .”) that are commonly 
provided to general education students.28  GNETS students are also excluded 
from general education school events like sport events, dances, and other 
social events that contribute to emotional and social education and 
development.29  Further, the learning environments of GNETS are not equal 
to that of general education schools.  Many GNETS buildings are older and 
lack effective air conditioning, proper light, and extra-curricular facilities 
like science labs, playgrounds, libraries, media centers, and physical 
educations rooms.30  Additionally, the majority of the classrooms do not 
allow for sufficient grade-level instruction because the classes are taught 
with multiple-grade levels in a single classroom where each student 
possesses a different type and level of disability.31  GNETS classrooms do 
not foster the development of student-teacher relationships because most 
instruction comes from computer-based lessons.32  These computer lessons 
also fail to provide proper educational stimulation.33  Thus, as the letter 
stated, the goal and aims of the GNETS are admirable in that the program 
purports to provide for the educational and therapeutic needs of students with 
disabilities and to fill a gap that existed in education since the 1970s.34  
While these are the stated aims, the manner in which the State is currently 
administering the program does not meet such goals.  
The Department of Justice concluded that the State can “redirect existing 
services, resources, training, and financial and human capital to appropriately 
integrate students with disabilities in the GNETS into general education 
schools and offer them full and equal opportunities to participate in the 
                                                                                                                   
 26 Id. at 10–12.  
 27 Id.   
 28 Id. at 15.  
 29 Id. at 16.    
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 17.  
 32 Id.   
 33 Id. at 15.  
 34 Georgia Network for Educ. And Therapeutic Support (GNETS), supra note 7. 
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electives, extracurricular activities, coursework, and other educational 
benefits and services enjoyed by their peers.”35  
Negotiations between Georgia and federal government officials failed.  
As a result, the United States initiated a civil action against Georgia for its 
non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
B.  The Department of Justice Sues the State of Georgia for Non-Compliance 
After the investigation, the United States filed a civil suit against the State 
of Georgia in the U.S. Court for the Northern District of Georgia on August 
23, 2016.36  The United States alleged that the complete segregation, lack of 
opportunities for extracurricular activities, and unequal educational settings 
for students in GNETS is a violation of Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.37  Title II focuses on public services of the state and local 
governments and prohibits discrimination by “public entities.”38  The 
complaint alleged that GNETS violates Title II of the Act because it 
unnecessarily segregates and discriminates against students with disabilities 
who could be taught in a general education setting.39  The United States said 
that the requirement of integrating students with disabilities comes from the 
community integration mandate provision in the ADA.40  In the 1999 U.S. 
Supreme Court case Olmstead v. L.C., the Court held that states must make 
services available to people with disabilities, including children with 
disabilities, in the most integrated setting possible.41  
Many of the factual allegations stated in the complaint mirror the details 
of the “letter of findings.”  First, the complaint asserted that GNETS’s 
educational centers are institutionalized segregated settings.42  These students 
are either segregated in GNETS self-contained buildings located at a distance 
from general education schools or in GNETS classrooms located in separate 
wings or isolated parts of the schools.  As a result, students in the program 
                                                                                                                   
 35 GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 18. 
 36 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
 37 Id.  
 38 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (1990).  
 39 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.   
 40 Id. (“This segregation is unnecessary for the vast majority of students and, therefore, 
violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits unnecessary 
segregation of persons with disabilities in state programs, services, and activities.   42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12131–12134.  Such unjustified isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities 
violates the ADA’s mandate that public entities ‘administer services, programs, and activities 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities.’ ”); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  
 41 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. 
 42 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.   
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are not provided with the opportunity to benefit from the range of possible 
interactions that would be available in a general education school.43  
Second, the complaint states that it is the manner in which the GNETS 
services are provided that has caused the unnecessary segregation in the 
centers and classrooms.44  The State has done this through its conduct.  For 
example, it has failed to provide sufficient funding for integrated services, 
failed to provide general education teachers with adequate training regarding 
students with behavioral-related disabilities, and used exit and entrance 
criteria that effectively screened out students with disabilities from integrated 
settings.45  
Third, the complaint alleged that there are students with behavioral-
related disabilities in GNETS who are qualified to receive services in a more 
integrated setting.46  Some students received mental health and therapeutic 
educational services in an integrated setting but the number was low, and the 
services available were relatively limited.47  The majority of students in 
GNETS would be able to participate in integrated, general education schools, 
the complaint alleged, if the State were to undertake what the complaint 
terms “reasonable” modifications of its methods of education for these 
children.48  
Fourth, the complaint alleged that the State failed to offer students in the 
GNETS Program equal opportunities to participate in electives, 
extracurricular activities, and general educational opportunities.49  The 
typical GNETS classroom is conducted with computer-based instruction, 
which stands in contrast to general education instruction that consists of a 
certified teacher for each subject area.50  GNETS students do not have the 
ability to participate in electives, extracurricular activities, or after-school 
athletic programs within the GNETS Program or with their “home school,” 
the original public school the child attended.51  Additionally, many of the 
buildings in which the GNETS Centers are located are inferior facilities in 
comparison to the general education buildings; these buildings often lack 
various amenities or features of a general education school such as libraries, 
cafeterias, science labs, music rooms, and playgrounds.52 Overall, the 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Id. ¶ 2.   
 44 Id. ¶ 1.   
 45 Id. ¶¶ 38–41.   
 46 Id. ¶¶ 3–4.   
 47 Id. ¶ 45.   
 48 Id. ¶¶ 57–58.   
 49 Id. ¶ 48.   
 50 Id. ¶ 47.   
 51 Id.    
 52 Id. ¶ 49.  
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complaint alleged that the approximate five thousand students with behavior-
related disabilities in the Georgia GNETS have been placed in “separate, 
segregated and unequal settings, and placed other students at serious risk of 
entering such settings, failing to comply with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.”53  
As remedies for these alleged violations, the United States sought 
numerous types of injunctive relief.  First, it requested a declaratory 
judgment that the State violated Title II of the Act.54  Second, the U.S. also 
sought to enjoin Georgia to both provide integrated mental health and 
therapeutic educational services that allow students to be placed in integral 
settings and to cease discriminatory practices against students in or entering 
the program by placing them in “the most integrated setting appropriate to 
the[ir] needs.”55  The position advanced in the complaint was that the most 
integrated, appropriate setting would be one in which the students could 
interact with, learn alongside, and learn from students without disabilities 
and in which they could enjoy access to equal educational materials and 
opportunities.56 
After months of negotiations and the ultimate failure to come to an 
agreement, the United States filed suit against the State of Georgia on August 
23, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.57  
The lawsuit has been filed under the category of civil rights and the ADA.58  
As of late November 2016, the complaint by the Department of Justice was 
the only major document that had been filed in the court, but there has also 
been an order of recusal of the judge originally assigned the case and various 
applications of admission for attorneys that will be appearing for the United 
States.59  The State of Georgia has not filed an answer or any documents with 
the court at this time.  
C.  Relevant Law Within the United States 
The United States’ complaint alleged the letter of findings and all of 
factual allegations stated in the complaint demonstrate the State of Georgia’s 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act through the “unnecessary 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Press Release, Dep’t of Just. Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Sues Georgia for 
Unnecessarily Segregating Students with Disabilities (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-georgia-unnecessarily-segregating-students-disabilities.  
 54 Complaint, supra note 1, at Prayer for Relief.   
 55 Id.    
 56 Id. ¶¶ 44–45. 
 57 Complaint, supra note 1.   
 58 Id.  
 59 Id.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018  5:45 PM 
2018]  SEGREGATION OF GEORGIA SCHOOLCHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 725 
 
segregation of persons with disabilities in state programs, services, and 
activities.”60 
1.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
The Americans with Disabilities Act was signed into law on July 26, 
1990.  The Act is one of the United States’ most comprehensive pieces of 
civil rights legislation that protects individuals from discrimination and 
ultimately guarantees that people with disabilities have the same 
opportunities that other Americans have available to them. 
  a.  Background and Overview 
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits any discrimination based 
on disability.  In order to be protected by the Act, a person must satisfy three 
statutory elements.  First, the person must have a disability, a term defined 
with respect to an individual person as a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.  
Second, there must be a record of such impairment.  Third, the person must 
be regarded as having an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment.61  The Act prohibits the covered entities from discriminating 
against individuals on the basis of disability in the areas of applications for 
employment, hiring procedures, promotions of employees, discharge of 
employees, compensation of employees, training of employees, and overall 
employment privileges.62  The Act also “prohibits state or local governments, 
departments, agencies, or other public entities from denying the benefits of 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”63  
Title I of the Act focuses on employment, specifically the type of 
employer, and guidelines for equal employment opportunities and reasonable 
accommodation processes.64  Title II of the Act concentrates on public 
services of the state and local governments and prohibits discrimination by 
“public entities.”65  Title III of the Act is centered on public accommodations 
and services that are operated by private entities and prohibits places of 
                                                                                                                   
 60 See id. ¶ 1; see also GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 14.   
 61 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12133; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 (2008)).   
 62 Alonso Diaz, DOJ Sues Georgia for Segregating Students with Disabilities, JURIST.ORG 
(Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/08/doj-sues-georgia-for-segregating-s 
tudents-with-disabilities.php#.V8csor3XaTo.twitter. 
 63 Id.  
 64 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (1990).  
 65 Id. §§ 12131–12165.  
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public accommodation that are privately owned from discriminating based 
on disability and sets minimal accessibility guidelines.66  Title IV of the Act 
focuses on telecommunications and requires telephone and internet 
companies to provide nationwide services to individuals with speech and 
hearing disabilities.67  Title V of the Act is a miscellaneous provision that 
relates to issues such as the relationship of the entire Act with other laws and 
with a state’s immunity.68 
  b.  Key Provisions 
Georgia’s operation of GNETS is alleged to be discriminatory conduct 
under Title II of the Act because the state program, a public entity, is the 
source of possible discriminatory practices.  This Title mandates that “no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination.”69  
A public entity engages in discriminatory practices based on disability when 
it engages in any of the following conduct:  
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity 
to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service; (ii) 
Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to 
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is 
not equal to that afforded others; (iii) Provide a qualified 
individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that 
is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the 
same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level 
of achievement as that provided to others; (vii) Otherwise limit 
a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any 
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others 
receiving the aid, benefit, or service.70 
In addition to the requirements that a public entity provide equal aid, 
benefit, and services to a qualified person, Title II requires public entities to 
provide services in the most integrated setting possible that are suitable to the 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. §§ 12181–12189.  
 67 Id. § 225.   
 68 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213 (1990). 
 69 Id. § 12131.  
 70 28 C.F.R § 35.130(b)(1)(i)–(vii) (1991).  
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needs of those individuals with disabilities.71  This aspect of Title II has been 
referred to as the “integration clause,” and its meaning was outlined in 
United States v. Olmstead, a 1999 Supreme Court decision.72  
  c.  Jurisprudence Interpreting Provisions 
The United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Olmstead, 
consolidated challenges by two female patients with mental disabilities 
regarding the Georgia Regional Hospital’s decision to keep them in 
psychiatric isolation.73  The Court was tasked with determining whether 
financial constraints of the hospital that prevented it from integrating the two 
patients should entirely determine whether states comply with the Act.74  In a 
6–3 decision, the Court concluded that the Act required individuals with 
mental disabilities be integrated when they have been cleared, expressed a 
personal desire, and resources are available to transfer them into integrated 
settings.75  The Court recognized that unjustified segregation reflects 
judgments that “[i]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and 
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwanted assumptions that 
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community 
life” and “institutional confinement severely diminishes individuals’ 
everyday life activities.”76  
In order to comply with the Act’s regulations, the Department of Justice 
has stated ways in which Georgia must change its policies, practices, and 
procedures.  The complaint generally stated that the services and supports 
that were currently being provided in the GNETS could be provided in a 
more integrated setting, “such as general education classrooms, community-
based settings near schools, and students’ homes.”77  These changes would 
fundamentally alter Georgia’s program, and it would allow for the students’ 
needs to be more appropriately met, taking into account Georgia’s resources 
and responsibilities to other students with disabilities throughout the State.78 
There has been debate over what is meant by the terms “segregation” and 
“discrimination” within the Act, which is discussed in Olmstead through 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.79  Justice Scalia begins his dissent with 
                                                                                                                   
 71 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1991).  
 72 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 589–90 (1999). 
 73 Id. at 581.  
 74 Id. at 587.  
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. at 583. 
 77 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 55.   
 78 Id. ¶ 59.  
 79 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:45 PM 
728  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:715 
 
 
concerns regarding the misuse of the traditional meanings of the words by 
stating that terms such as “segregation were used in the more general sense, 
pertaining to matters such as access to employment, facilities, and 
transportation” and that without a clear congressional directive in the 
alternate it would be improper to assume a different meaning of the terms.80  
Next, he argued that based on the canons of construction, the definition used 
by the majority in Olmstead was imported from Title I, but because Congress 
said “segregation” in one part of the Act and not in Title II, this shows a 
purposeful and intentional omission.81 
The United States alleged that Georgia GNETS is a violation under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  External norms and international treatment 
of individuals with disabilities is relevant and useful in answering the 
question of whether Georgia’s GNETS system of educating students with 
disabilities away from general education school is discrimination.  
III.  INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
This Note focuses on two relevant international treaties that set forth 
international norms in the area of discrimination: the 1996 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.  
A.  1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
On December 16, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the Social and 
Political Cultural Rights (CESCR).82  Manfred Nowak in his book, U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary, stated that 
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, 
with its two Optional Protocols, . . . form the ‘International Bill of Human 
Rights’, the core of human rights protections in the world community.”83 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Id. at 621. 
 81 Id.  
 82 NOWAK, supra note 5, at XI.  
 83 Id. at XVII.  
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1.  Background and Overview 
In 1993, shortly after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations held 
the second World Conference on Human Rights in a period of political 
change.  The goal of the Conference was to focus on violations of human 
rights and the methods that could be implemented to protect these rights.84  
The International Bill of Human Rights was formed during this period and is 
currently seen as the most influential and “universally recognized minimum 
standard” of conduct for states in the area of human rights laws and 
procedures.85  The International Covent on Civil and Political Rights came 
into force on March 23, 1976; at this point in time, over two-thirds of U.N. 
member states have joined as parties.86 
The United Nations defines human rights as rights that are “inherent to all 
human beings, without distinction as to race, colour, gender, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”87  Within the category of human rights there are both civil 
rights and political rights that are covered by the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  Civil rights “guarantee liberal freedom of the individual 
from the State” and political rights “guarantee the democratic freedom of 
access to the State.”88  Some of the broad and fundamental rights laid out in 
the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights are rights to: self-determination; 
life; family; participation in the electoral process; due process and a fair trial; 
freedom from torture, slavery, genocide; freedoms of speech, expression, 
conscience, and religion; and the enjoyment of equal protection of the laws 
and to these rights by women, men, children, and minorities.89 
2.  Compliance Mechanism 
States Parties assume various obligations and duties that protect human 
rights when they ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The 
obligation to respect these rights means that the States must not interfere 
with these rights, must protect individuals from human rights violations, and 
must take action in facilitating the protection of these rights.90  
                                                                                                                   
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2 ¶ 1. 
 87 U.N., Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Page 
s/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).  
 88 NOWAK, supra note 5, at XVII. 
 89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4. 
 90 Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/Fre 
quentlyAskedQuestions.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).  
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Under Article 2, “the States Parties commit themselves to respect the 
human rights recognized in the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] and 
to ensure them without discrimination to all individuals. . . .”91  The State’s 
obligations are laid out in Article 2(1) and guarantee that each State assumes 
the responsibility of ensuring that all people within their territory are 
afforded the protection of all rights laid out in the Covenant.92  This section 
is further complemented by Article 2(2), which “requires the States Parties 
‘to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the rights’ guaranteed in the Covenant whenever such provisions do not 
already exist in its domestic law.”93  Under the Covenant there is an 
immediate obligation on the State Party to take any and all measures 
necessary to ensure that the rights and proclamations contained in the 
Covenant are being protected.94  
International covenants are treaties.  Along with the status of an 
international treaty, each covenant creates legally binding obligations the 
member states must follow and any noncompliance issues that arise are 
subject to international law, not solely domestic law.95  Following ratification 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, domestic law and measures 
became the main channel through which human rights are protected and 
guaranteed under international law.  
In addition to the responsibilities that domestic states are given, each 
international covenant has its own enforcement mechanism to ensure that the 
States are complying with all of the obligations set forth in the Covenant.  
The Human Rights Committee, or Committee, is the monitoring body as set 
forth in Part IV Article 28 through Article 45 on Civil and Political Rights.96  
Article 28 states that the Committee will be comprised of eighteen members 
that are either nominated or elected by the States Parties.97  One of the 
enforcement procedures of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the 
                                                                                                                   
 91 NOWAK, supra note 5, at XXII. 
 92  Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 93 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 51–52 
(4th ed. 1988); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 2, opened for 
signature December 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976). 
 94 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 52. 
 95 Id. at 33.  
 96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4. 
 97 Id. at 179.  
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monitoring mechanism in Article 40 that allows States Parties to self-report 
any factors that are influencing or hindering their ability to implement the 
Covenant.98  It is the Committee’s principal purpose to examine all of the 
monitoring reports submitted by the States Parties.99  There is no expressed 
power conferred to the Committee to conduct investigations into the conduct 
of the States Parties after reviewing the reports, but the Committee may 
question State Party officials who are required to be present while their 
reports are being examined.100  The examination of States Parties’ reports by 
an independent, unbiased group of experts in the field has proven to be “an 
effective instrument for monitoring domestic implementation measures.”101  
3.  Status in the United States 
In the United States, a treaty will be ratified when the Senate gives it’s 
“Advice and Consent” by a two-thirds majority.102  In 1992, the United 
States became the one hundred and fifteenth state party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  There has been and continues to be 
debate surrounding the topic of the United States’ ratification of the 
Covenant.  One scholar at the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal 
Advisor, David P. Stewart, contended that the ratification of this treaty 
marked the United States’ long-standing commitment to the protection of 
individual human rights and liberties and to the promotion of these rights 
                                                                                                                   
 98  The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein 
and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one 
year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties 
concerned; (b) . . . whenever the Committee so requests. . . . All reports shall 
be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
transmit them to the Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the 
factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present 
Covenant. . . . The Secretary-General of the United Nations may . . . transmit 
to the specialized agencies . . . copies of … parts of the reports as may fall 
within their field of competence. . . . The Committee shall study the 
reports. . . .  It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments . . . to the 
States Parties.  The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social 
Council these comments along with the copies of the reports. . . .  The States 
Parties to the present Covenant may submit . . . observations on any 
comments that may be made in accordance with paragraph 4 of this article. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4. 
 99 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 53. 
 100 Id. at 54. 
 101 NOWAK, supra note 5, at XIX. 
 102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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internationally.103  And additionally, that the ratification marked a 
cornerstone in U.S. diplomacy because the Covenant is considered by many 
to be the most important human rights treaty in international law and because 
the unanimous approval by the U.S. Senate marked a neutralization in “a 
persistent thread of hostility in that body and in the American legal 
community to ratification of human rights treaties.”104  Another scholar at the 
University of Quebec, William A. Schabas, focused on the fact that the 
United States’ ratification came accompanied with several reservations and 
declarations, two of which aim to exclude the United States from the 
Covenant’s scope.105  While this paper focused on the legality of the 
reservations, it represents a split among legal scholars on the overarching 
meaning and result of the United States’ ratification of the Covenant. 
Agreement is seen by William Schabas’s conclusory statement that the 
United States’ ratification of the Covenant represented a cornerstone in U.S. 
diplomacy because ratification indicated a recognition of contemporary 
international human rights law.106 
The United States came out of the Second World War as a leader and 
advocate “of a treaty-based international system for the protection of human 
rights,” but the United States’ policy developed into one of total non-
participation in international agreements mainly due to the fear of an 
emergent “world government.”107  The United States did not ratify any major 
international treaty or post-war treaty, even ones that supported international 
consensus, on the subject of human rights until 1988 when it ratified the 
Genocide Convention.108 
When the United States ratified the Covenant, it did so without allowing 
the treaty to be self-executing in the United States, which means that the 
Covenant provisions cannot be enforced in U.S. courts.  Due to the nature of 
the ratification process the Executive has developed a system of 
“reservations, understanding, and declarations” or RUDs that are designed to 
address and overcome any objections the Senate will have to ratification.109  
                                                                                                                   
 103 David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1183, 1184–85 (1993); BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 412. 
 104 Stewart, supra note 103, at 1184. 
 105 William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 277 (1995).  
 106 “The accession to the Covenant, after decades of isolationism, indicated a recognition by 
the United States that its previous indifference to contemporary international human rights law 
was a source of embarrassment and had become a political liability.”  Id. at 324. 
 107 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 413. 
 108 Id. at 416. 
 109 Id. at 433. 
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In effect, these RUDs are modifications to the terms of the treaty as it 
pertains to the agreement between the state that made the RUPs and the 
states that are accepting the RUDs.110  As Louis Henkin, professor emeritus 
at Columbia Law School and chairman of the Center for the Study of Human 
Rights at Columbia University, noted, there are five main categories that are 
attached to human rights treaties: first, the United States will not undertake 
any treaty that is inconsistent with the United States Constitution; second, the 
United States adherence to an international human rights treaty should not 
affect—or promise—change in existing U.S. law or practice; third, the 
United States will be subject to jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice to decide disputes as to the interpretation or application of human 
rights conventions; fourth, every human rights treaty to which the United 
States adheres should be subject to a “federalism clause”; fifth, every 
international human rights agreement should be “non-self-executing.”111 
All nation-states that ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are 
allowed to attach various reservations to their agreement to ratify, but the 
United States’ attachment of multiple RUDs to human rights treaties has 
brought great criticism.112  The non-self-executing RUDs have received the 
greatest criticism because of the large impacts that this provision has on a 
State’s obligations under the treaty.  The United States’ non-self-executing 
mechanisms effectually precluded a U.S. citizen from filing petitions 
charging the State with violations of their rights under the Covenant in U.S.  
Courts.113  Critics of this provision have argued that this decision “effectively 
nullifies the treaty as a legal instrument that defined U.S. government’s 
obligations to its citizens.”114  Along with the practical criticism, there has 
been a policy criticism that the decision not to adopt the self-executing 
provision is another way that the United States is avoiding external criticism 
from foreign states and maintaining the face of the strongest state in the 
international realm.115   
                                                                                                                   
 110 Id. 
 111 Penny M. Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States: 
The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011). 
 112 Id. at 104.  
 113 Id. at 107.  
 114 See id.; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 700 (1995) (“The doctrine of self-execution is a long-standing but confusing 
judicial doctrine created many decades ago.”).  
 115 Venetis, supra note 111, at 109 (quoting Professor Henkin, “the reservation designed to 
deny international obligations serve to immunize the United States from external judgment, the 
declaration that a convention shall be non-self-executing is designed to keep its own judges from 
judging the human rights conditions in the United States by international standards”).  
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  a.  Charming Betsy Canon of Statutory Construction 
The extent to which intentional law or customary international practices 
and principles apply to the United States has always been a topic of debate.  
This discussion comes up in the context of whether it is appropriate for U.S. 
domestic courts to look at international norms in their decision-making 
process or whether international and foreign law may be cited as a reference 
point in domestic cases.  Using international law and international norms as 
an interpretive tool has been a tradition of U.S. law for a large part of the 
nation’s history and this is referred to as the Charming Betsy canon.116  
The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation comes from the 1804 
Supreme Court case Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy where the Court 
held that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law 
of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”117  The case 
presented the issue of whether the Charming Betsy ship was subject to 
seizure and condemnation for violating a law of the United States.118  Since 
the Charming Betsy case, this canon has become an important part of the 
U.S.’s legal relationship with international law.119  According to Curtis A. 
Bradley, Duke University School of Law Professor of Public Policy Studies, 
one conception of this canon is that it is grounded in separation of powers 
concerns, and stand for the proposition that unless Congress specifically 
states its intent to violate international norms, the U.S. courts will not 
interpret legislation in a way that will place the United States in violation of 
international law.120  
The Charming Betsy canon of interpretation is particularly useful when 
the terms of legislation are either ambiguous or absent.  Curtis A. Bradley 
quoted Phillip R. Trimble who stated: “[W]hen actual congressional intent is 
ambiguous or absent, applying the Charming Betsy canon is the same as 
creating a rule that the government regulatory scheme cannot violate 
international law.”121  This principle and means of interpretation are relevant 
to the discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act because of the 
ambiguities in the key terms—segregation and discrimination—used 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 482 (1998).   
 117 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  
 118 Id. at 118. 
 119 Bradley, supra note 116, at 482; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  
 120 Bradley, supra note 116, at 526. 
 121 Id. at 483 (quoting Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International 
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 675 (1986)).  
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throughout the Act that are unclear due to the different definitions and 
applications of each term.  
  b.  Use of External Legal Norms as Aids of Interpretation 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a cause of 
action for Georgia’s GNETS programs that is separate from the current civil 
action United States v. Georgia will not be created.  Even though a separate 
cause of action will not stand, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
still relevant to interpret key statutory or constitutional provisions.  It is not 
necessary that a relevant norm govern a situation, but the fact that the norm 
is relevant deems it worth considering.122 
There are various viewpoints that address the issue of whether or not the 
Covenant, or any legal treaty that the United States is a party to, has any 
legal effect on the State.  One understanding is based in Article VI of the 
United States Constitution that states, “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land. . . .”123  This view asserts that treaties that have been ratified become 
domestic law that hold the same normative rank as the U.S. Constitution as 
long as it does not conflict with constitutional provisions and that treaty law 
may triumph federal and state law.124  Another view is based on precedent of 
the United States Supreme Court where the Court has rejected claims under 
the Covenant without consideration of the merits due to RUD conditions that 
have been attached to the ratification of international treaties, which 
precludes the Covenant from being a source of international law.125  The 
position of the Covenant, and international law in general, stands at a middle 
ground of authority and has been disputed in various federal and state court 
cases.  The non-self-executing RUDs have precluded American courts from 
treating international treaty law as a source of domestic law, but at the same 
time American courts are expected to give effect to the treaty law.  The 
United States as a whole is expected to uphold the obligations of the 
Covenant.126 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Diane Marie Amann, “Raise the Flag and Let it Talk”: On the Use of External Norms in 
Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 597, 609 (2004). 
 123 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  
 124 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 418.  
 125 Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 329 (2000). 
 126 Venetis, supra note 111, at 107; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (AM. LAW INST. XXXX).  
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The United States has often been seen as isolationist in its general 
approach of not considering external legal norms and practices when making 
internal decisions.  In 2003, two landmark Supreme Court decisions, 
Lawrence v. Texas and Gratz v. Bollinger, marked an era of change with the 
United States moving away from isolationism and towards the use of 
external norms.127  Both of these cases overruled the Court’s prior 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.128  Diane Marie Amann, Faculty Co-
Director of the Dean Rusk International Law Center, stated that the 2003 
judgements of the Supreme Court marked the “Court’s willingness to look 
beyond U.S. borders when circumstances warrant” and shared that external 
norms are relevant for internal matters to the degree that they “resonate with 
American values and American experience.”129  The Court’s decision to seek 
guidance from external norms has not been consistent.  As Amann stated, 
every member of the Court has become more receptive of consulting external 
norms, but the Court’s consultation of external norms has been selective and 
“unbounded by any coherent criteria.”130  External norms are relevant to 
internal matters.  Therefore, the question becomes under what circumstances 
an external norm will be relevant.131  Courts are national institutions, so they 
are subject to the continued globalization of human activities and, thus, the 
courts too must adapt to external norms.132 
According to Amann, the label of “comparable legal standards” as a 
criterion for referencing an “external” norm is a misnomer, because the 
external norms the United States Supreme Court has looked to matter by 
virtue of their link to an internal norm.133  Thus, the external norms the Court 
has looked at are norms currently held by the Court.  The reference then 
comes in as a means of persuasive authority by the Court looking at the ways 
that external bodies treat a particular norm.134  Following World War II, 
liberty and equality norms dominated.135  The United States endorsed these 
norms when it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.136  The provisions and terms of the Covenant promote values held by 
the United States.137  Consulting external norms is not seeking guidance from 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Amann, supra note 122, at 597. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. at 598.  
 130 Id. at 604.  
 131 Id. at 605.  
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 606.  
 134 Id.   
 135 Id. at 607.  
 136 Id.   
 137 Id.  
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a different value system; rather, it is “finding internal resonance with 
practices that are labeled external.”138  A court is free to apply or disregard a 
relevant external norm, but that decision has no bearing on whether or not 
the norm is in fact relevant.139 
4.  Key Provisions 
The League of Nations formed the Committee for the Protection of 
Children in 1919 and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 
1924.140  The intention of these treaties was not to create a binding set of 
domestic laws but to set up a body of guiding principles for States to look to 
when formulating their own domestic law.141  
In addition to its role as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
enforcer, the Human Rights Committee functions as a body that interprets 
the Covenant’s provisions.  Throughout the years, the Committee has 
adopted nearly three dozen General Comments designed to present guidance 
to States Parties in discharging their obligations under the Covenant.142  
These General Comments do not create binding international law, but under 
Article 40(4)143 of the Covenant, these are generally complied with and 
“considered to be the most authoritative interpretation of the Covenant’s 
provisions.”144  General Comments created by the Human Rights Committee 
are comparable to a judicial body that interprets the Covenant’s provisions 
with such authority that the comments are relied upon when evaluating 
whether or not a State Party has complied with the Covenant’s obligations in 
examining the state reports or in private citizen adjudication.145 
                                                                                                                   
 138 Id. at 608–09 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 322 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1996) (“Recognizing that the United States has 
promoted and embraced international human rights standards deriving from ours, Justices 
might yet conclude that a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that we look to 
international standards to illuminate our constitutional values of liberty, equality, property.”)).  
 139 Id. at 609.    
 140 TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 21 (3d ed. 2014). 
 141 Id. at 22. 
 142 See BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 59. 
 143   The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the 
present Covenant.  It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as 
it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties.  The Committee may also 
transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the 
copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present 
Covenant. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 2 ¶ 1. 
 144 Id.; see also NOWAK, supra note 5, at XIX.  
 145 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 59. 
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There are various relevant provisions in the Covenant that address the 
issue of whether the State of Georgia’s operation of the GNETS, exhibits 
segregation or is discriminatory in nature. 
  a.  Article 24: Non-Discriminatory Protection of the Child 
   i.  Text of Article 24 
Article 24 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets out the 
“rights of the child,” and states:   
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, 
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, 
society and the State.  
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and 
shall have a name. 
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.146 
This section does not set forth any specific rights to the child, nor does it 
guarantee general applicability of all Covenant provisions to the child.  
Instead, ratifying states pledge to uphold this provision by taking steps to 
ensure the child is protected either by family, other means of a support 
system, or through the Covenant’s own functions.147  These protections 
include minimum norms for civil processes, e.g., regulation between parents 
and children; laws of custody; norms of heritage and guardianship; and 
special criminal law treatment—including minimum standards for harming a 
child, establishment of an age for criminal liability, and standards of criminal 
treatment for juveniles.148  Additionally, there are protections to ensure the 
child has proper nutrition, housing, recreation, medical care, security, and 
education.149  Article 24 also prohibits discrimination based on any of these 
categories; this provision is violated when a child does not receive the 
protection she is entitled to or “receives less protection than other 
children.”150 
                                                                                                                   
 146 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 24. 
 147 NOWAK, supra note 5, at 424. 
 148 Id. at 425. 
 149 Id. at 425–26. 
 150 Id. at 427. 
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   ii.  Jurisprudence Interpreting Article 24: General Comment No. 
17 (Rights of the Child) 
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 17, issued in 
1989, addressed the rights of the child provided in Article 24 of the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.151  General Comment 17 discusses the special 
rights and protections given to children under the Covenant solely based on 
their status as minors.152  The particular age that a person receives child 
status under the Covenant is left to the State Party to determine based on 
social and cultural norms, but the Covenant specifies that a State Party 
cannot absolve itself of providing these protections for persons under the age 
of eighteen.153  
The Comment sets forth certain procedures that are necessary to provide 
special protection to children, but the majority of procedural decisions are 
left to the States to determine based on the specific needs within their 
jurisdiction.154  The Comment specifically addresses the issue of education 
by stating that with respect to children: “In the cultural field, every possible 
measure should be taken to foster the development of their personality and to 
provide them with a level of education that will enable them to enjoy the 
rights recognized in the Covenant, particularly the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.”155  The Comment characterizes Article 24 as 
affording every child, without discrimination on any basis, the stated 
procedures and unstated procedures that are necessary to protect the child 
and foster the child’s development solely on the basis that the person is 
afforded the special child status protections.156  
  b. Article 26: Rights to Equal Protection 
Another applicable provision in the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
is Article 26 which lists the rights under the Covenant that are necessary in 
order for there to be equality.  
                                                                                                                   
 151 U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 17: Article 24 
(Rights of the Child) (Apr. 7, 1989), http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139b464.html. 
 152 Id. at 1–2.  
 153 Id.   
 154 Id. at 1.  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id.  
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   i.  Text of Article 26 
Article 26 states that all persons are equal and entitled to equal protection 
of the law.157  Additionally, Article 26 states the law shall guarantee all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”158  Historically, 
Article 26 developed out of a general consensus that equality stood as the 
foundation of human rights law.159  Within Article 26 there are various 
protections that relate to equality that have been discussed in detail due to 
proposed amendments and their surrounding debates.  
Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affords three 
different protections to the persons within States Parties that form the 
Article’s independent right to equality: the right to equal protection of the 
law, the right to the prohibition of discrimination, and the right to protection 
against discrimination.160  The right to equality before the law is not directed 
at the legislature, but at judges and government officials to ensure that the 
law is applied and enforced equally with regard to all individuals.  These 
principle states that different treatment of individuals must be based on 
objective factors; the factors are not exclusively the characteristics listed in 
the second sentence of Article 26.161  The Article guarantees the equal 
protection of the law in the first sentence, then in the second sentence of the 
Article sets forth the negative and positive prohibitions and protections that 
the national legislatures must accomplish in order to provide that 
protection.162  This interpretation comes from the connector words that start 
the second sentence, “[i]n this respect,” and while this phrase was originally 
intended to only apply to equality before the law, the extended meaning was 
given through the adoption of the Indian amendment.163  Through Article 26, 
States Parties have an obligation to ensure that their legislation provides 
substantive equality to all persons in their jurisdiction, and courts have 
                                                                                                                   
 157 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26. 
 158 Id.  
 159 See NOWAK, supra note 5, at 458 (stating that “[a]long with liberty, equality is the most 
important principle imbuing and inspiring the concept of human rights”).  
 160 Id. at 469. 
 161 Id. at 466–67. 
 162 Id. at 468. 
 163 Id. (citing VIERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973) 
(THE HAGUE) (“The Indian delegate rejected this addition with the argument that these are two 
different concepts of equality and that equal protection of the law does not result from equality 
before the law.”)).  
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looked to the meaning of discrimination to determine whether or not this has 
been accomplished.164 
   ii.  Jurisprudence Interpreting Article 26: General Comment No. 
18 (Non-Discrimination) 
The Committee’s General Comment 18, issued in 1989, discusses the 
non-discrimination provision set forth in Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.165  Article 26 not only entitles all persons to equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law but also prohibits any 
discrimination under the law and guarantees all persons protection against 
discrimination on grounds such as “race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”166  This listed criteria, or categories of discrimination, has been 
chosen because these characteristics are seen as particularly problematic as a 
basis for distinction due to the fact that these are inherent personal 
characteristics that cannot be changed by the person and have been subject to 
a history of negative treatment.167  
The Human Rights Committee states that the Covenant has not 
specifically defined the term discrimination and has not detailed what 
constitutes discrimination. Instead, the Covenant lists personal characteristics 
that indicate discrimination when used as the basis for determining whether a 
person may receive a benefit, aid, or services.168  By looking at the ways 
other antidiscrimination has been defined, the Human Rights Committee 
stated that in its view the term as used on the Covenant shall mean: 
to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
                                                                                                                   
 164 Id. at 469. 
 165 U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26 
(Non-Discrimination) (Nov. 10, 1989) U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), http://ccprcentre. 
org/page/view/general_comments/27792.  
 166 Id. ¶ 1.  
 167 See NOWAK, supra note 5, at 44, 474 (discussing the Committee’s interpretation of 
impermissible grounds for distinction under Article 2(1) of the Covenant).  
 168 U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), supra note 165, ¶ 6.  
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enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all 
rights and freedoms.169   
Further, General Comment 18 said that there may be times when affirmative 
action, or specific action to correct discriminatory conditions, is needed to 
combat conditions that “cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited 
by the Covenant.”170  The Committee indicated that if the general conditions 
of a subset of the population limits or prevents those individuals from 
enjoying the human rights they are afforded, then it may be necessary for the 
State Party to implement special or preferential treatment for that group.171  
This is considered to be legitimate differentiation under the Covenant’s terms 
because it is needed to remedy the discrimination that is occurring.172  
Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
protection against discrimination, limited to those provisions specifically set 
forth in the Covenant; whereas, Article 26 is not limited in that way and 
provides protection against discrimination and the right to equality on any 
enumerated grounds.173  The Committee stated that this is a separate and 
more expansive right from the one stated in Article 2 and that Article 26 
prohibits all “discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and 
protected by the public authorities.”174  States Parties’ current legislation and 
enforcement of legislation must comply with the non-discrimination 
obligation under Article 26, which applies to more than those rights stated in 
the Covenant.175 
In evaluating whether there has been a discrimination violation under 
Article 26, the Human Rights Committee stated that differentiation of 
treatment is not discrimination when “the criteria for such differentiation are 
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is 
legitimate under the Covenant.”176  The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights uses the word “discrimination,” not “distinction.”177  Manfred Nowak 
asserted that this choice was made to allow distinctions when they are 
justified but not allow invalid distinctions based on “unfavourable and 
odious distinctions which lacked any objective or reasonable basis.”178  
                                                                                                                   
 169 Id. ¶ 7.  
 170 Id. ¶ 10.  
 171 Id.  
 172 Id.  
 173 Id. ¶ 12.  
 174 Id.  
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. ¶ 13.  
 177 NOWAK, supra note 5, at 473 n.76. 
 178 Id.  
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Therefore, an invalid “distinction” is “discrimination” only when it is not 
based on reasonable and objective criteria.179  The conclusion as to whether a 
distinction is in fact “discrimination” is based on all of the surrounding, 
relevant circumstances, evaluated on a case-by-case basis.180  According to 
Manfred Nowak, discrimination will be found “when the parties concerned 
find themselves in a comparable situation and when the distinction is based 
on unreasonable and subjective criteria.”181  
B.  2007 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted 
by the United Nations in 2006, and it went into effect in May 2008.182  The 
Convention represented the development of international law in which the 
international community sought to create effective responses to abuses of 
persons with disabilities.183  While the United States has signed but not yet 
ratified this treaty, certain provisions of the treaty are useful to amplify an 
understanding of what constitutes impermissible discrimination against 
children under the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.  The Covenant 
provided characteristics of the persons to be protected from discrimination, 
and it expanded on the conduct that constitutes discrimination of students 
with disabilities.  The Convention provides a better understanding of 
international law’s position on what constitutes discrimination in schools 
against students with disabilities, which may in turn aid the interpretation of 
relevant U.S. law.  
1.  Background, Overview, and Compliance Mechanism 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities targets the 
discrimination against persons with disabilities and aims to guarantee those 
persons the exercise of basic human rights.184  The Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, like the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
has a body of experts that monitor the implementation of the Convention by 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Id. at 473.  
 180 Id.  
 181 Id. at 473–74.  
 182 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf.  
 183 PENELOPE WELLER, NEW LAW AND ETHICS IN MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 18 
(Routledge 2013) (citing Don MacKay, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 323, 323–31 (2007)).  
 184 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, art. 1.  
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State Parties.185  The Optional Protocol of the Convention gives the body of 
experts the ability to examine individual complaints with regards to alleged 
violations.186  Further, like the Covenant, the Convention’s body of eighteen 
independent experts interpret the Convention’s articles in the form of general 
comments.  
The United States has not yet chosen to ratify this Convention, and 
therefore, the obligations are not applicable to the United States.  
Nevertheless, the Convention can be used to inform the broader meaning and 
understanding of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because of the 
fuller discussion and focus of the Convention on persons with disabilities.  
2.  Key Provisions 
There are two main articles in the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: Article 2 provides a definition of discrimination on the 
basis of disability and Article 24 details the rights to inclusive education.187 
  a.  Article 2: Definition of “Discrimination on the Basis of Disability” 
The Convention focuses solely on disability with many of the terms 
discussed in the Covenant defined in the Convention in the context of 
disability. 
   i.  Text of Article 2 
The Convention requires that measures be implemented without 
discrimination on the basis of disability.188  Article 2 of the Convention sets 
out definitions for the Convention:  
For the purposes of the present Convention: . . . 
“Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability 
which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with 
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.  It 
                                                                                                                   
 185 BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 114. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, arts. 2, 24. 
 188 Id. art. 2. 
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includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of 
reasonable accommodation. . . .189 
Article 2 further defines reasonable accommodation as the  
[N]ecessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not 
imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in 
a particular case, to ensure persons with disabilities the 
enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.190  
The definition of discrimination and reasonable accommodation are both 
applicable to further understanding the terms used in Article 24 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which sets forth non-discriminatory 
protection of the child. 
 b.  Article 24: Right to Inclusive Education 
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
discusses the rights of persons with disabilities to inclusive education. 
   i.  Text of Article 24 
The relevant portions of this Article set out the necessary requirements to 
ensure that students with disabilities are being educated in a non-
discriminatory manner.  First, Article 24 paragraph 1 states that persons with 
disabilities have the right to education free from discrimination and on the 
basis of equal opportunity ensured through inclusive education directed to: 
(a) The full development of human potential and sense of 
dignity and self-worth, and the strengthening of respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and human diversity;  
(b) The development by persons with disabilities of their 
personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and 
physical abilities, to their fullest potential;  
(c) Enabling persons with disabilities to participate effectively 
in a free society.191 
                                                                                                                   
 189 Id.  
  190  Id. 
 191 Id. art. 24 ¶ 1.  
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Next, Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Convention states that persons with 
disabilities should not be excluded from the general education system on the 
basis of disability and have access to an inclusive, quality education on an 
equal basis with others; persons with disabilities should receive the support 
required, within the general education system that facilitates their effective 
education consistent with the goal of inclusion.192 
Finally, Article 24, paragraph 4 of the Convention states that States 
Parties should take appropriate measures to employ teachers and staff at all 
levels of education and train them in a way that incorporates disability 
awareness and the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes, 
means, and formats of communication, educational techniques, and materials 
to support persons with disabilities.193 
   ii.  Jurisprudence: General Comment No. 4 (Right to Inclusive 
Education) 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was the first 
legally binding instrument that contained a reference to the concept of 
quality inclusive education.194  The Convention’s General Comment No. 4 
asserted that, according to their own study, inclusive education is the only 
way that persons with disabilities can be educated equally, both in terms of 
the quality of education and in a way that provides necessary social 
developments.195  Inclusive education is defined as: 
Inclusion involves a process of systemic reform embodying 
changes and modifications in content, teaching methods, 
approaches, structures and strategies in education to overcome 
barriers with a vision serving to provide all students of the 
relevant age range with an equitable and participatory learning 
experience and environment that best corresponds to their 
requirements and preferences.196  
                                                                                                                   
 192 Id. art. 24 ¶ 2. 
 193 Id. art. 24 ¶ 4. 
 194 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), CRDP General Comment 
No. 4: Article 24 (Right to Inclusive Education), (Sept. 2, 2016), U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/4, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/GC.aspx (follow “Article 24: Right to 
Inclusive Education” hyperlink; then follow “English PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter CRDP 
General Comment No 4: Article 24].  
 195 Id. ¶ 2.   
 196 Id. ¶ 11.   
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According to General Comment 4, inclusive education is required under 
Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Convention in all levels of education and 
extracurricular and social activities associated with schools.197  Integrating 
disabled students into the general education schools does not automatically 
transition education from segregation to inclusion; instead, inclusive 
education involves a “whole systems” approach that considers a whole 
educational environment and the whole person, along with supported 
teachers, respect for and value of diversity, learning-friendly environment, 
effective transitions, recognition for partnerships, and monitoring on a 
continued basis.198 
Article 24, paragraph 1(a) reiterates the aims of education that must be 
focused on the full development of the human potential, including the sense 
of dignity and self-worth, which prohibits the exclusion of persons with 
disabilities from the general education system.199  Article 24, paragraph 1(b) 
states that the education of persons with disabilities should not be in the form 
of a deficit approach—one focused on actual or perceived impairments—
instead, education should be focused on the development of personality, 
talents, and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.200  In order 
to achieve this, the education system must comprise four interrelated criteria: 
first, availability of sufficient programs in public and private schools; 
second, accessible buildings, information, and communication; third, 
acceptability of all requirements, cultures, and languages; fourth, adaptable 
learning environments provided by teachers and other staff.201  Article 24, 
paragraph 1(c) asserts the aims of education must be to enable persons with 
disabilities to fully participate in a free society.202 
Article 24, paragraph 2 requires the States Parties to provide reasonable 
accommodations for disabled students that enable them to access education 
on an equal basis with others.203  This section affirms that disabled students 
are entitled to individualized support that is necessary to facilitate their 
effective education, including availability of services and sufficiently trained 
teaching staff, psychologists, and other relevant professionals.204  These 
measures must be implemented with the goal of inclusion and in a manner 
                                                                                                                   
 197 Id. ¶ 8.  
 198 Id. ¶ 12.  
 199 Id. ¶ 15. 
 200 Id. ¶ 16.  
 201 Id. ¶¶ 20–22, 25–26.  
 202 Id. ¶ 17.  
 203 Id. ¶ 28.  
 204 Id. ¶ 32.  
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that strengthens the opportunities for students with disabilities to participate 
in the classroom and in out-of-school activities alongside their peers.205 
Article 24, paragraph 4 requires that States Parties take measures to 
employ administrative, teaching, and other staff with skills necessary to work 
effectively with disabled students in inclusive environments.206  A school 
must have an appropriate number of qualified professionals to work with 
disabled students to maintain effective inclusive education environments.207 
The Convention’s detailed explanation of the terms and procedures 
necessary to ensure students with disabilities are not being discriminated 
against in the education system is useful in analyzing whether the State of 
Georgia GNETS programs are currently being conducted in a discriminatory 
manner under the Covenant because of the similarity in terms and goals.  
IV.  EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF VIOLATION 
A. Is There a Violation Under International Law? 
The propriety of Georgia’s use of GNETS is a close case under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, but the manner in which GNETS has been 
administered is a clear violation based on intentional law standards.  GNETS 
is a violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights because GNETS students do not receive a quality of 
education equal to that of students in general education schools in multiple 
facets, and because the environment of education segregates GNETS 
students away from general education schools and activities.  
B.  Equality Violation Under Article 26 of the ICCPR 
Article 26 provides three distinct rights to which persons within States 
Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are entitled: the right to 
equal protection of the law, the right to prohibition of discrimination, and the 
right to protection against discrimination.208  The issue here is not whether a 
specific law in the United States is being administered in an unequal manner; 
rather, the issue is whether GNETS is being administered in a discriminatory 
manner.  In reaching a conclusion on the issue, this Note will look: first, at 
the basis for distinction between students who are in the GNETS Programs; 
second, at whether the separation is based on reasonable and objective 
                                                                                                                   
 205 Id. ¶ 34.  
 206 Id. ¶ 36.  
 207 Id.   
 208 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26. 
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criteria; third, at whether there is a legitimate purpose to the distinction under 
the Covenant; and fourth, at whether there is equality or discrimination 
between GNETS students and general education school students.  
First, the separation of GNETS students from general education schools is 
based on a student having one or more severe characteristics that are 
indicative of an emotional or behavioral disability.209  Article 26 lists a 
number of inherent, personal characteristics that are immediately suspect 
when a person is classified based on them.  These inherent qualities include 
traits like race, gender, religion, and “other status.”210  The decision to 
include the last term “other status” indicates the Covenant’s goal of 
protecting discrimination on any grounds that is an inherent trait and to 
dissuade the interpretation that protections are only afforded to the specific 
enumerations listed.  The status of a person with an emotional or behavioral 
disability falls into the category of “other status,” and is therefore protected 
by Article 26, the Covenant’s Equality provision.  
Second, Article 26 has been interpreted as requiring that the 
differentiation be based on reasonable and objective criteria.211  In this case, 
the decision to place a student into the GNETS Program begins with a 
referral from general education school for an evaluation.  The evaluation is 
later conducted by referencing the State Party’s criteria for entry and exit 
standards.  Much of this process of evaluation looks at the severity, 
frequency, and duration of the disorder.212  The ultimate decision of 
placement is made by the student’s local school based on these three types of 
manifestations of the disability that have been documented.213  There is no 
further information, criteria, or descriptions of what makes a student eligible 
for the GNETS Program; this decision appears to be a subjective decision by 
the local school team members after there has been a referral from the 
general school.  The local school considers objective criteria in making the 
decision of whether a student should be placed into GNETS, but the overall 
process of making that decision does not appear to be sufficiently objective 
or reasonable as required by the Covenant.  
Third, Article 26 inquires into whether the purpose of the distinction is 
legitimate under the Covenant.214  The asserted purpose of the separation of 
                                                                                                                   
 209 Complaint, supra note 1.   
 210 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 26. 
 211 CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26, supra note 165, at 3.   
 212 See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. § 160-4-7-.15(2) (2007), http://rules.sos.state.ga.us/gac/160-4-
7; Ga. Dep’t of Ed., GNETS Operations Manual at 9, 11–12 (Jan. 2014) (the “GNETS 
Operations Manual”), http://www.gadoe.org/Cur riculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Special-
Education-Services/Documents/GNETS/FY14% 20Operations%20Manual.pdf. 
 213 Id. at 13.  
 214 CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26 (Non-Discrimination), supra note 165, at 3. 
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GNETS students from places of general education is to provide them with 
comprehensive educational and therapeutic support services.215  In 
connection with this purpose, the goal is to provide students with services in 
a public setting instead of in a residential or more restrictive placement.  
Providing students with behavioral and emotional disabilities the level of 
attention and programs they need to learn is certainly a legitimate purpose.  
The factual allegations suggest that the manner in which GNETS is currently 
being conducted does not achieve this goal. 
Finally, even when there are arguably objective criteria and a legitimate 
purpose, Article 26 will still be violated if the means of achieving that 
purpose are not appropriately suited.  GNETS is a violation of this provision 
and is discriminatory not because the students are being separated but for the 
following two reasons: first, GNETS students do not have access to a wide 
range of activities and resources making their education unequal; second, 
GNETS students are not being afforded the opportunity to be educated in an 
integrated setting because of the lack of resources allocated by the State to 
ensure this opportunity.  
The GNETS Program is not equal to general education schools because of 
the lack of opportunities to take elective subjects, the exclusion from extra-
curricular activities, the lack of subject certified teachers, and the reliance on 
computer based teaching.216  First, GNETS Program students are not given 
the opportunity to participate in elective classes like art, foreign language, 
and vocational course that the students in general education schools are 
exposed to.217  The lack of exposure to electives keeps GNETS students from 
being as well-rounded in their education and skill sets as their general 
education peers.  
Second, GNETS Program students are not allowed to participate in the 
extra-curricular activities that take place at their home school, nor do they 
have extra-curricular activities of their own.218  The Convention General 
Comment No. 4 focused on the fact that the aim of education should be on 
the full development of students, which is a goal that cannot be achieved 
when students with disabilities are excluded from the general education 
system and activities.219  Extra-curricular activities include attending sports 
games, dances, and other social events that commonly take place at schools.  
                                                                                                                   
 215 See § 160-4-7-.15(2); Ga. Dep’t of Ed., GNETS Operations Manual at 5, 11–12 (Jan. 2014) 
(the “GNETS Operations Manual”), http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessm 
ent/Special-Education-Services/Documents/GNETS/FY14%20Operations%20Manual.pdf. 
 216 GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 15. 
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The lack of inclusion in the activities at their home schools necessarily leads 
GNETS students to have feelings of inferiority, exclusion, and differentness.  
Also, these activities further the development of social and emotional 
education.  Learning to work together on a school team or being focused on 
an activity are practical skills that general education schools foster through 
these types of activities that the GNETS students will not be exposed to.  
Third, the overall quality of education in GNETS programs is generally 
not equal to the education in general education schools.  For most of the 
GNETS programs, the students are taught through computer based 
programs.220  The attention and education that is facilitated by a physical 
teacher in a classroom is not comparable to learning from a computer screen. 
Many GNETS facilities are in poor physical condition and most lack 
additional extra-curricular facilities like libraries, playgrounds, and science 
labs.221  Under Article 26, this excludes the GNETS students from enjoying 
human rights, specifically the right to a quality education that is comparable 
to general education students, that they are entitled to receive.222 
The separation and distinction of students due to a behavioral or 
emotional disability alone would not provide for a violation under Article 26, 
but the GNETS programs are not equal to general education programs.  The 
unequal conditions and education in the GNETS programs fits within the 
Convention’s definition of discrimination because it is an exclusion on the 
basis of disability that has the effect of impairing the exercise of a right that 
is on an equal basis with others.223  These students are not being allowed to 
reach their full mental, physical, or creative potential due to the differences 
in education. 
GNETS programs have not allowed students that are willing and able to 
be integrated into general education schools.  Once students are placed into 
the GNETS programs they are completely isolated and segregated from their 
peers.  Many of the GNETS programs are located in separate buildings that 
are at different locations than general education schools, and even when 
programs are on the same campus, they are located in basements or separate 
wings of the school.224  There is not any interaction between the two groups 
of students.  After a student has been placed into the GNETS program it is 
difficult for them to return to general education school due to the strict exit 
criteria.  It is easy for a school to send students that become a behavioral 
                                                                                                                   
 220 Id. ¶ 56. 
 221 Id. ¶ 58.  
 222 CCPR General Comment No. 18: Article 26, supra note 165, ¶ 1. 
 223 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 182, art. 2. 
 224 GNETS Letter of Findings, supra note 6, at 9.   
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disruption in the classroom away, and there is little incentive to 
accommodate those students in the general classroom.  
The lack of integration or efforts to integrate is a violation under Article 
26, because the Covenant requires that affirmative steps be taken in order to 
combat conditions that “cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited 
by the Covenant.”225  The Human Rights Committee suggested that when 
certain groups are discriminated against, it may be legitimate to treat those 
groups with preferential treatment to remedy the discrimination.226  The 
Convention expands on this proposition by stating that students with 
disabilities should be educated in the general education schools as long as 
they are willing and that specialty teachers and conditions should be included 
in the general classrooms that facilitate the inclusion.227  The GNETS are 
discriminatory because it does not attempt to integrate the students in any 
manner.  
C.  The Limits and Scope on Enforceability 
The scope of enforceability of Article 26 of the Covenant will be limited 
in scope by the United States’ decision not to implement non-self-executing 
RUDs upon ratification of the Covenant, which precludes a person from 
bringing a cause of action under the Covenant’s provisions in the United 
States.  More importantly, when the United States ratified the Covenant it did 
so with a series of “reservations, understandings, and declarations” that limit 
the applicability of certain obligations in the Covenant to the United States.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, the goal of the lawsuit in United States v Georgia is to force 
the State of Georgia to bring its educational systems for students with 
disabilities into compliance with the ADA.  The goal and stated purpose of 
the GNETS Program, to provide students with disabilities the therapeutic 
services that they need, is a legitimate and admirable purpose, but the 
manner in which the program is currently functioning does not meet that 
purpose.  Instead, students with disabilities are being segregated and 
educated in a way that is unequal to students in general education.  The 
inequality of electives, extra-curricular classes, access to resources and 
teachers, and the lack of efforts to integrate the students who could be 
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integrated arguably makes the GNETS Program a violation of the ADA and 
also a violation of international human rights law.  
There are a number of manners in which the State of Georgia could 
remedy this problem.  The DOJ listed a few changes that the State could 
make in order to comply with the ADA.  The two suggestions focus on 
equality and integration.  First, the State should make all efforts necessary to 
provide integrated and therapeutic mental health services that will allow 
students to be placed in more integrated settings.228  The level of integration 
should be specific to each individual student, but it is necessary that the State 
takes affirmative steps to integrate GNETS students in a way that best suits 
the educational needs of those students.  Second, the State should stop 
discrimination practices against the students currently in or entering the 
GNETS program.229  Since certain students may be able to focus and learn 
more efficiently in a segregated setting, it is necessary for the State to ensure 
that all of the class and extra-curricular opportunities, resources, and 
environments are equal to what is being provided to general education 
students.  Further, appropriate steps should be taken to guarantee that 
teachers and staff members that are certified in the subject area and methods 
of teaching students with behavioral and emotional disabilities are placed in 
the integrated and separated educational settings.  Educators should be 
trained in ways that incorporates disability awareness and the appropriate 
educational techniques and formats of communication that are effective to 
support persons with disabilities.230 
The national and state governments are in the best position to ensure that 
the country’s children with disabilities are not being discriminated against, 
and this begins with educating them equally and in a manner that will foster 
their development to reach their full potential.  The current GNETS schools 
in Georgia does not adequately meet this goal.  The administration of the 
GNETS program does not meet the standard of international human rights 
law.  The current problem and lack of compliance by the State demonstrated 
the need for a civil suit to be initiated.  In determining whether or not 
Georgia’s conduct is acceptable it is important to view the issue against the 
backdrop of international standards. 
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